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Abstract	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  indict	  cognitive	  theories	  that	  presume	  innate	  representational	  structures,	  and	  they	  reject	  most	  modern	  theories	  of	  psychology,	  because	  these	  posit	  a	  role	  for	  encoding	  in	  knowledge	  development.	  Their	  interactionist	  perspective	  has	  value,	  but	  their	  approach	  is	  unnecessarily	  exclusive	  of	  perceptual	  learning,	  and	  dismissive	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  symbolic	  representations	  can	  emerge	  in	  systems	  that	  encode	  stimuli.	  Although	  transcending	  the	  nativist-­‐empiricist	  debate	  is	  desirable,	  the	  authors	  have	  not	  proven	  that	  encoding	  conceptions	  of	  representation	  necessarily	  protract	  this	  debate,	  or	  that	  only	  action-­‐based	  approaches	  can	  transcend	  it.	  Systems	  theories	  and	  connectionism,	  too,	  can	  help	  overcome	  that	  misguided	  debate.	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The	  Babies,	  the	  Representations,	  and	  the	  Nativist-­‐Empiricist	  Bathwater	  	   Various	  versions	  of	  the	  ‘nativist-­‐empiricist	  debate’	  have	  been	  with	  us	  at	  least	  since	  John	  Locke	  formulated	  some	  of	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  empiricist	  philosophy	  in	  the	  17th	  century	  (Locke,	  1690).	  As	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  suggest	  in	  their	  target	  article	  (this	  issue),	  empiricist	  and	  nativist	  perspectives	  have	  dominated	  the	  scientific	  landscape	  in	  pendulum-­‐like	  alternation	  across	  the	  centuries.	  Most	  recently,	  from	  the	  1970s	  into	  the	  present,	  theories	  and	  data	  consistent	  with	  nativism	  have	  assumed	  positions	  of	  prominence	  in	  the	  Developmental	  Psychology	  literature	  (Baillargeon,	  1987;	  Meltzoff	  &	  Moore,	  1977;	  Spelke	  &	  Kinzler,	  2007;	  Wynn,	  1992).	  However,	  for	  more	  than	  50	  years,	  several	  theorists	  have	  been	  arguing	  forcefully	  that	  nativism	  in	  all	  its	  variations	  is	  inherently	  non-­‐developmental	  (Beach,	  1955;	  Blumberg,	  2005;	  Gottlieb,	  1981;	  Johnston,	  1987;	  Moore,	  2001).	  Although	  there	  are	  nativists	  who	  disagree	  with	  this	  assessment	  (Carey,	  2009;	  Spelke	  &	  Newport,	  1998),	  the	  rise	  of	  nativism	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  critics.	  	   Among	  these	  critics	  have	  been	  those	  arguing	  that	  systems	  theories	  such	  as	  Dynamic	  Systems	  Theory	  (Thelen	  &	  Smith,	  1994),	  connectionism	  (Elman,	  Bates,	  et	  al.,	  1996),	  and	  Developmental	  Systems	  Theory	  (Oyama,	  Griffiths,	  &	  Gray,	  2001;	  Spencer,	  Blumberg,	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  can	  help	  us	  dispense	  with	  the	  nativist-­‐empiricist	  debate,	  and	  thereby	  facilitate	  the	  study	  of	  development.	  I,	  too,	  believe	  transcendence	  of	  the	  nativist-­‐empiricist	  debate	  is	  a	  worthy	  goal	  (Moore,	  2001,	  2009),	  so	  Allen,	  Bickhard,	  and	  I	  agree	  on	  this	  point.	  But	  even	  though	  achieving	  transcendence	  is	  likely	  to	  entail	  utilizing	  an	  approach	  similar	  in	  some	  ways	  to	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard’s,	  certain	  aspects	  of	  their	  arguments	  could	  nonetheless	  hinder	  progress	  toward	  our	  goal.	  	   In	  their	  introduction,	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  define	  emergent-­‐constructivism	  as	  “the	  assumption	  that	  representational	  knowledge	  can	  be	  emergent	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  action	  systems”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  97).	  Emergence	  and	  construction	  are	  concepts	  that	  now	  seem	  likely	  to	  be	  essential	  elements	  of	  any	  comprehensive	  theory	  of	  psychological	  development;	  certainly	  it	  has	  become	  clear	  that	  the	  biological	  processes	  that	  underlie	  psychological	  development	  involve	  emergence	  and	  construction.	  In	  fact,	  functional	  genes—once	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  basic,	  atomistic	  elements	  responsible	  for	  biological	  development—are	  now	  known	  to	  be	  constructed	  in	  a	  developmental	  process,	  so	  genes	  as	  we	  conceived	  of	  them	  through	  much	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  do	  not	  actually	  exist	  (Keller,	  2000;	  Moss,	  2003;	  Noble,	  2006).	  Once	  constructed,	  genes	  are	  best	  thought	  of	  not	  as	  agents	  that	  cause	  development,	  but	  rather	  as	  resources	  that	  interact	  and	  collaborate	  with	  other,	  nongenetic	  developmental	  resources	  in	  ways	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  complex	  biological	  organs	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like	  the	  brain,	  an	  organ	  characterized	  by	  structures	  and	  functions	  that	  are	  never	  determined	  by	  genetic	  factors	  alone	  (Griffiths	  &	  Gray,	  1994;	  Lickliter	  &	  Berry,	  1990;	  Moore,	  2001;	  Robert,	  2004).	  Discoveries	  about	  the	  roles	  of	  emergence	  and	  construction	  in	  biology	  have	  influenced	  thinking	  among	  infancy	  researchers	  so	  much	  that	  the	  XVIIth	  annual	  presidential	  address	  to	  the	  International	  Society	  on	  Infant	  Studies	  was	  strongly	  critical	  of	  nativistic	  theories	  that	  disregard	  these	  findings	  (Lewkowicz,	  2011).	  	   Notwithstanding	  the	  ascendance	  of	  such	  ideas	  among	  infancy	  researchers,	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  remain	  concerned	  that	  developmental	  psychologists—including	  nativists,	  but	  also	  those	  who	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  empiricists	  or	  systems	  theorists—still	  lack	  the	  theoretical	  resources	  needed	  to	  adequately	  account	  for	  the	  emergence	  and	  construction	  of	  representational	  knowledge	  in	  the	  human	  mind.	  Because	  of	  this	  focus	  on	  representational	  knowledge,	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  believe	  transcending	  the	  nativist-­‐empiricist	  debate	  will	  require	  more	  than	  adopting	  a	  perspective	  that	  highlights	  the	  roles	  of	  emergence	  and	  construction	  in	  development.	  Specifically,	  they	  argue	  that	  this	  transcendence	  will	  require	  abandoning	  a	  central	  idea	  in	  cognitive	  science,	  namely	  that	  “representation	  is	  fundamentally	  constituted	  as	  encodings”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  manuscript	  p.	  2).	  Furthermore,	  they	  argue	  that	  only	  an	  “action-­‐based	  framework”	  will	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  “the	  nature,	  origins	  and	  development	  of	  human	  knowledge”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  96).	  It	  is	  on	  these	  latter	  two	  points	  that	  our	  opinions	  diverge.	  	   Allen	  and	  Bickhard’s	  conclusions	  result	  from	  their	  commitment	  to	  maintaining	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  “epistemic	  contact	  (detection)	  and	  epistemic	  content	  (representation)”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  114).	  Epistemic	  contact	  occurs	  whenever	  an	  organism	  detects	  “objects	  and	  properties	  in	  the	  world,”	  whereas	  epistemic	  content	  is	  generated	  only	  when	  epistemic	  contact	  generates	  “knowledge…of	  those	  objects	  and	  properties”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  127,	  emphasis	  added).	  So,	  for	  example,	  a	  tree	  detects	  (i.e.,	  makes	  epistemic	  contact	  with)	  its	  environment	  inasmuch	  as	  the	  climatic	  conditions	  in	  which	  it	  is	  growing	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  width	  of	  its	  growth	  rings;	  however,	  trees	  do	  not	  know	  anything	  about	  (i.e.,	  have	  any	  epistemic	  content	  about)	  their	  environments.	  Similarly,	  Reznick	  (2000)	  offered	  the	  example	  of	  infants	  who	  respond	  with	  the	  same	  rash	  to	  allergens	  that	  derive	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  categorically	  related	  sources,	  thereby	  indicating	  that	  they	  have	  
detected	  something	  similar	  about	  the	  allergens	  even	  if	  they	  do	  not	  actually	  know	  anything	  about	  the	  category.	  In	  contrast,	  an	  adult	  who	  has	  allergic	  reactions	  to	  cherries,	  peaches,	  and	  plums	  might	  avoid	  novel	  fruits	  like	  nectarines	  because	  she	  knows	  she	  has	  an	  allergy	  to	  drupes,	  fruits	  that	  contain	  a	  single	  hard	  pit	  at	  their	  core.	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  like	  nectarines	  because	  she	  knows	  she	  has	  an	  allergy	  to	  drupes,	  fruits	  that	  contain	  a	  single	  hard	  pit	  at	  their	  core.	   Central	  to	  Allen	  &	  Bickhard’s	  argument	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  “standard	  encoding	  models	  of	  representation”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  121)	  intrinsically	  conflate	  the	  ideas	  of	  epistemic	  contact	  and	  epistemic	  content;	  among	  infant	  researchers,	  such	  conflation	  often	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  using	  the	  single	  word	  “representation”	  to	  refer	  both	  to	  what	  occurs	  when	  stimuli	  are	  detected	  and	  to	  what	  occurs	  when	  knowledge	  is	  generated.	  Remarkably,	  Allen	  &	  Bickhard	  believe	  their	  indictment	  of	  such	  encoding	  models	  applies	  to	  any	  model	  that	  fits	  within	  “the	  information-­‐processing	  framework	  of	  the	  cognitive	  revolution”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  99),	  whether	  it	  is	  fundamentally	  empiricist,	  nativist,	  connectionist,	  or	  interactionist.	  Consequently,	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  critical	  of	  virtually	  all	  mainstream	  psychological	  theories	  developed	  over	  the	  past	  five	  decades,	  because	  all	  of	  these	  theories	  include	  an	  important	  role	  for	  encoding	  processes.	  	   The	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “representation”	  to	  refer	  to	  several	  different	  things	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  has	  been	  noted	  in	  the	  infant	  development	  literature.	  Writing	  about	  this	  issue,	  Haith	  (1998)	  pointed	  out	  that	  infant	  researchers	  sometimes	  use	  this	  word	  “to	  refer	  to	  the	  coding	  of	  information	  in	  neural	  networks”	  (p.	  173),	  wherein	  specific	  patterns	  of	  neural	  activity	  are	  present	  (or	  are	  hypothesized	  to	  be	  present)	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  specific,	  corresponding	  stimuli.	  But,	  Haith	  notes,	  these	  researchers	  also	  sometimes	  write	  as	  if	  	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  coding	  of	  information	  in	  neural	  networks”	  (p.	  173),	  wherein	  specific	  patterns	  of	  neural	  activity	  are	  present	  (or	  are	  hypothesized	  to	  be	  present)	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  specific,	  corresponding	  stimuli.	  But,	  Haith	  notes,	  these	  researchers	  also	  sometimes	  write	  as	  if	  	  …	  infants	  can	  re-­‐present	  events	  to	  themselves	  by	  calling	  them	  up	  from	  memory,	  to	  generate	  a	  schema	  or	  image	  that	  they	  reason	  about,	  create	  expectations	  and	  beliefs	  from,	  and	  make	  inferences	  about…[and	  in	  such	  cases,	  infant	  researchers]	  are	  talking	  about	  …	  something	  that	  begins	  to	  sound	  like	  a	  symbolic	  representation.	  (p.	  173,	  emphasis	  added)	  So,	  infant	  researchers	  have	  used	  “representation”	  to	  mean	  several	  things,	  and	  by	  considering	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  practice,	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  have	  provided	  a	  valuable	  service,	  because	  confusion	  is	  bound	  to	  arise	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  polysemy	  (Keller,	  2010).	  	   Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  seem	  to	  believe	  “representation”	  should	  be	  reserved	  for	  symbolic	  representations,	  or	  knowledge.	  Therefore,	  one	  might	  suppose	  that	  their	  criticism	  of	  encoding	  models	  of	  representation	  would	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apply	  only	  to	  findings	  about	  symbolic	  encoding,	  not	  to	  findings	  about	  non-­‐symbolic	  encoding.	  [As	  a	  possible	  example	  of	  the	  latter,	  consider	  Goldman-­‐Rakic’s	  (1995)	  finding	  that	  spatial	  locations	  of	  no-­‐longer-­‐seen	  but	  to-­‐be-­‐remembered	  stimuli	  are	  encoded	  neurologically.]	  But	  in	  response	  to	  Haith’s	  suggestion	  that	  infant	  researchers	  distinguish	  between	  sensory	  encodings	  and	  symbolic	  representations,	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  write	  	  while	  this	  distinction	  is	  able	  to	  illuminate	  the	  important	  difference	  between	  detection	  (sensory	  encoding)	  and	  representational	  knowledge	  of	  what	  those	  detections	  are	  about	  (symbolic	  representation)	  it	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  encodingism	  may	  be	  equally	  present	  in	  both.	  That	  is,	  that	  sensory	  encodings	  might	  only	  differ	  from	  images	  and	  schemas	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  nature	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  presumed	  encoding-­‐correspondence	  relationships	  involved.	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  manuscript	  p.	  51)1	  	  Similar	  statements	  in	  their	  article	  suggest	  that	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  believe	  incorporating	  even	  just	  the	  notion	  of	  sensory	  encoding	  (i.e.,	  detection)	  into	  a	  theory	  of	  cognitive	  development	  undermines	  that	  theory’s	  ability	  to	  posit	  emergence	  or	  construction.	  	   It	  is	  undoubtedly	  worth	  noting	  that	  polysemy	  can	  sow	  confusion,	  but	  rejecting	  all	  modern	  theories	  of	  psychology	  seems	  unlikely	  to	  be	  helpful,	  given	  how	  productive	  these	  theories	  have	  been.	  Clearly,	  infant	  researchers	  should	  be	  careful	  when	  using	  variants	  of	  the	  word	  “represent,”	  always	  specifying	  if	  they	  are	  talking	  about	  symbolic	  representation	  or,	  for	  instance,	  an	  encoding	  of	  a	  stimulus	  in	  primary	  visual	  cortex.	  But	  given	  that	  brains	  do	  detect	  stimuli,	  eliminating	  the	  idea	  of	  encodings	  from	  our	  theories	  will	  probably	  not	  be	  constructive.	  Although	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  recommend	  such	  elimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  “encoding	  models	  inherently	  conflate	  …epistemic	  contact	  [detection]	  …and	  epistemic	  content	  [representation]”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  127),	  there	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  this	  conflation,	  one	  that	  can	  help	  us	  recognize	  why	  encoding	  models	  are	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  be	  of	  use	  to	  cognitive	  developmentalists.	  	   The	  reason	  infant	  researchers	  often	  conflate	  detection	  and	  representation	  can	  be	  surmised	  by	  reading	  further	  into	  Haith’s	  (1998)	  criticism	  of	  nativist	  research.	  There,	  he	  notes	  that	  there	  is	  “substantial	  neurophysiological	  evidence	  that	  many	  of	  the	  same	  neurons	  that	  are	  active	  during	  short	  memory-­‐delay	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  quotation	  comes	  from	  the	  manuscript	  that	  the	  author	  of	  this	  commentary	  was	  asked	  to	  comment	  on;	  it	  was	  subsequently	  deleted	  from	  the	  target	  article	  after	  the	  commentaries	  went	  to	  press.	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periods	  are	  the	  sensory	  neurons	  that	  objects	  or	  events	  activate	  when	  present”	  (p.	  173-­‐174).	  He	  then	  cites	  Ungerleider	  (1995),	  who	  wrote	  “many	  studies	  have	  found	  cells	  whose	  response	  to	  the	  initial	  cue	  is	  maintained	  at	  some	  level	  through	  the	  delay	  period.	  Thus,	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  cue	  appears	  to	  endure	  by	  maintaining	  the	  activity	  of	  cells	  that	  represent	  the	  cue”	  (p.	  174).	  Here,	  Ungerleider	  used	  the	  word	  “represent”	  in	  a	  standard	  way	  that	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  would	  nonetheless	  object	  to	  (i.e.,	  not	  to	  refer	  to	  symbolic	  representation).	  But	  more	  important	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Ungerleider’s	  observation	  undermines	  the	  idea	  that	  sensory/perceptual	  processes	  and	  mnemonic/cognitive	  processes	  can	  be	  clearly	  distinguished.	  If	  infant	  researchers	  conflate	  detection	  and	  representation,	  perhaps	  it	  is	  because	  the	  distinction	  between	  them	  cannot	  be	  as	  strictly	  maintained	  as	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  would	  have	  it.	  	   As	  noted	  above,	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard’s	  criticism	  of	  theories	  that	  use	  the	  idea	  of	  encoding	  is	  rooted	  in	  their	  concerns	  about	  conflation	  between	  detection	  and	  (symbolic)	  representation.	  But	  even	  though	  our	  intuitions	  tell	  us	  that	  knowledge	  is	  distinct	  from	  detection,	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  clear	  how	  to	  construe	  “knowledge”	  as	  different	  from	  “perception”	  given	  that	  both	  utilize	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  neurological	  resources	  (e.g.,	  Martin,	  Haxby,	  et	  al.,	  1995;	  Martin,	  Wiggs,	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  In	  discussing	  the	  need	  to	  distinguish	  detection	  and	  representation,	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  write	  that	  “a	  thermostat’s	  sensitivity	  to	  temperature	  constitutes	  an	  ability	  to	  detect	  differences…[but]	  the	  thermostat	  does	  not	  have	  representational	  knowledge	  regarding	  what	  those	  detections	  are	  about	  –	  temperature”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  121).	  This	  analysis	  seems	  reasonable,	  of	  course,	  but	  a	  human	  brain	  is	  quite	  a	  bit	  more	  complex	  than	  a	  thermostat,	  and	  although	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  understand	  how	  conscious,	  symbolic	  knowledge	  emerges	  in	  our	  brains,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  the	  structures	  and	  processes	  involved	  in	  detection	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  structures	  and	  processes	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  higher-­‐order	  representation;	  consider,	  for	  example,	  Penfield’s	  classic	  studies	  (1954,	  1975)	  in	  which	  neurological	  stimulation	  was	  able	  to	  produce	  the	  subjective	  experiences	  of	  hearing,	  remembering,	  dreaming,	  and	  seeing.	  	  Although	  we	  all	  have	  the	  subjective	  impression	  that	  we	  “know”	  things	  about	  the	  world—that	  is,	  that	  a	  conscious,	  epistemic	  agent	  in	  our	  heads	  is	  able	  to	  interpret	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  information	  that	  reaches	  it—neuroscientists	  have	  overwhelmingly	  rejected	  this	  Cartesian	  perspective	  as	  untenable	  (see	  Dennett,	  1991).	  Instead,	  it	  now	  seems	  plausible	  that	  detection—along	  with	  accurate	  and	  inaccurate	  recollection	  of	  what	  was	  previously	  detected—might	  produce	  non-­‐symbolic	  “representations”	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  later-­‐emerging,	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truly	  symbolic	  representations.	  Perhaps	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  need	  not	  be	  as	  concerned	  as	  they	  are	  about	  conflating	  detection	  and	  representation,	  because	  symbolic	  representations	  in	  human	  minds	  might	  result	  from	  aggregations	  of	  sensory	  encodings	  in	  human	  brains.	  Just	  as	  there	  are	  properties	  of	  water	  that	  cannot	  be	  detected	  in	  a	  single	  molecule	  of	  H2O—properties	  that	  emerge	  when	  enough	  molecules	  of	  H2O	  are	  in	  proximity	  to	  one	  another—it	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  think	  that	  qualitatively	  novel	  properties	  of	  mind	  (e.g.,	  symbolic,	  
meaningful	  representations)	  could	  emerge	  from	  mere	  ‘detection’	  processes	  operating	  in	  our	  brains.	  	  This	  possibility	  significantly	  weakens	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard’s	  criticisms	  of	  Dynamic	  Systems	  Theory	  (DST),	  connectionism,	  and	  Dynamic	  Field	  Theory	  (DFT).	  DST	  can	  tolerate	  the	  possibility	  that	  knowledgeable	  systems	  like	  ours	  might	  develop	  merely	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  our	  brains	  representing	  the	  world	  the	  way	  tree	  rings	  do,	  that	  is,	  without	  any	  built-­‐in	  mechanisms	  for	  interpretation	  by	  an	  epistemic	  agent.	  Likewise,	  notwithstanding	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard’s	  protestation	  that	  “the	  meaningfulness	  of	  any	  [“representation”	  generated	  by	  a	  connectionist	  network]	  …	  depends	  entirely	  on	  an	  external	  observer”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  124),	  the	  meaningfulness	  of	  any	  “representation”	  generated	  by	  a	  person’s	  brain	  might	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  interpretations	  of	  an	  epistemic	  agent,	  either	  inside	  or	  outside	  of	  the	  person’s	  head.	  Instead,	  perhaps	  conceptual	  representations	  emerge	  when	  perceptions	  are	  “represented”	  in	  a	  sufficiently	  complex	  nervous	  system	  merely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  epistemic	  contact.	  If	  so,	  then	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard’s	  criticisms	  of	  DFT	  can	  also	  be	  dismissed,	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  DFT	  model	  of	  representation	  does	  not	  require	  the	  cognizant	  “interpreter”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  125)	  they	  think	  it	  does.	  Although	  they	  state	  that	  the	  “encodingism	  [characteristic	  of	  DFT,	  connectionism,	  and	  any	  other	  information-­‐processing	  model	  of	  cognitive	  development]	  precludes	  the	  possibility	  of	  emergent	  representation”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  120),	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  from	  their	  arguments	  in	  this	  paper	  why	  this	  must	  be	  the	  case.	  Nor	  was	  it	  clear	  why	  they	  believe	  all	  encoding	  conceptions	  of	  representation	  necessarily	  induce	  “oscillations	  between	  nativism	  and	  empiricism”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  129).	  	   In	  fact,	  some	  of	  our	  symbolic	  representations	  might	  best	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  epiphenomena.	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  distinguish	  between	  a	  genuinely	  “informational”	  relationship	  “in	  the	  semantic	  or	  representational	  sense”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  	  128),	  and	  a	  "technical—covariational—informational	  relationship"	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  120)	  in	  which	  a	  system’s	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  environment	  results	  merely	  in	  covariation	  between	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  system.	  Consistent	  with	  this	  conceptualization,	  a	  baby’s	  brain	  might,	  through	  the	  simultaneous	  firing	  of	  a	  specific	  collection	  of	  neurons,	  establish	  a	  “technical	  informational	  relationship”	  with	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a	  dog	  she	  sees,	  but	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  would	  not	  consider	  this	  to	  mean	  the	  baby	  has	  generated	  a	  symbolic	  representation	  of	  the	  dog.	  But	  even	  if	  this	  specific	  neural	  activity	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  symbolic	  representation	  of	  the	  dog	  for	  the	  baby,	  the	  "technical”	  relationship	  provides	  information	  about	  the	  dog,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  symbolic	  representation	  might	  not	  be	  as	  important	  as	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  seem	  to	  think	  it	  is.	  If	  detection—along	  with	  recollection	  and	  manipulation	  of	  that	  which	  has	  been	  detected—can	  provide	  information	  required	  to	  survive	  and	  reproduce	  in	  this	  world,	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  clear	  what	  the	  importance	  of	  "representational	  knowledge"	  might	  be.	  One	  bit	  of	  evidence	  relevant	  to	  this	  suggestion	  is	  the	  finding	  that	  Schöner	  and	  Thelen	  (2006),	  using	  a	  dynamic	  field	  model	  of	  habituation,	  were	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  coherent	  explanation	  of	  all	  of	  the	  extant	  data	  related	  to	  Baillargeon’s	  (1987)	  occluded	  object	  paradigm,	  without	  needing	  to	  presume	  that	  infants	  have	  any	  representational	  knowledge	  of	  objects	  at	  all.	  Of	  course,	  the	  development	  of	  imagination	  and	  some	  other	  distinctively	  human	  cognitive	  processes	  might	  still	  require	  additional	  explanation	  (but	  see	  Martin	  et	  al.,	  1996,	  for	  neurological	  evidence	  from	  a	  task	  requiring	  “imagined”	  behavior).	  However,	  the	  preponderance	  of	  human	  psychological	  processes—for	  example,	  all	  of	  those	  we	  share	  with	  other	  mammals,	  including	  “error	  guided	  behavior	  and	  learning”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  126)—probably	  do	  not	  require	  the	  kind	  of	  "representational	  knowledge"	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  fight	  so	  hard	  to	  save.	  A	  complete	  understanding	  of	  human	  cognition	  requires	  a	  theory	  that	  explains	  how	  people	  can	  sometimes	  understand	  the	  conceptual	  basis	  of	  an	  abstract	  category,	  but	  a	  science	  of	  cognitive	  development	  can	  still	  make	  progress	  without	  first	  resolving	  such	  issues.	  	   If	  perception	  and	  cognition	  are	  not	  as	  distinct	  as	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  seem	  to	  believe,	  then	  the	  idea	  of	  encoding	  might	  be	  unproblematic,	  and	  theories	  of	  cognitive	  development	  can	  posit	  emergence	  and	  construction	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  action-­‐based.	  Although	  there	  are	  many	  empirical	  reasons	  to	  believe	  action	  contributes	  to	  cognitive	  development	  (Campos,	  Anderson,	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Sommerville,	  Woodward,	  &	  Needham,	  2005;	  Soska,	  Adolph,	  &	  Johnson,	  2010),	  it	  seems	  unnecessarily	  restrictive	  to	  maintain	  that	  “only	  an	  action	  based	  approach”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  96,	  emphasis	  added)	  will	  provide	  a	  workable	  theory	  of	  cognitive	  development,	  or	  that	  “action	  is	  essential	  and	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  ontology	  of	  representation	  itself”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  124).	  After	  all,	  if,	  as	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  assert,	  “knowledge	  just	  is	  competent	  (inter)action	  with	  the	  environment”	  (MS	  p.	  127,	  emphasis	  in	  original),	  one	  implication	  would	  be	  that	  damage	  to	  the	  human	  spinal	  cord	  at	  the	  second	  cervical	  vertebra—and	  its	  consequent	  tetraplegia—must	  necessarily	  entail	  an	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immediate	  loss	  of	  “knowledge,”	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  generate	  new	  knowledge,	  a	  proposition	  that	  seems	  prima	  facie	  to	  be	  false.	  While	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  are	  probably	  right	  that	  a	  truly	  passive	  mind	  cannot	  come	  to	  know	  the	  world,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  require	  the	  kind	  of	  action	  (i.e.,	  motor	  activity)	  they	  insist	  on.	  Instead,	  approaches	  like	  DST	  or	  connectionism	  seem	  equipped	  to	  account	  for	  the	  emergence	  and	  construction	  of	  representational	  knowledge	  even	  if	  some	  of	  that	  knowledge	  arises	  from	  interactions	  between	  the	  world	  and	  non-­‐action-­‐based	  processes	  like	  perception	  (as	  in	  Martin	  et	  al.,	  1995).	  Such	  approaches	  need	  not	  posit	  the	  existence	  of	  either	  conceptual	  or	  perceptual	  “innate	  representational	  features”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  116).	  	   For	  reasons	  detailed	  in	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard’s	  comprehensive	  critique—including,	  importantly,	  the	  “lack	  of	  perceptual	  level	  controls”	  (Allen	  &	  Bickhard,	  p.	  117)	  used	  in	  typical	  nativist	  infant	  research	  (see	  also	  Clearfield	  &	  Mix,	  1999,	  2001;	  Cohen	  &	  Marks,	  2002;	  and	  Moore	  &	  Cocas,	  2006)—the	  findings	  and	  arguments	  of	  nativists	  like	  Baillargeon	  (1987),	  Wynn	  (1992),	  Spelke	  and	  Kinzler	  (2007),	  and	  Carey	  (2009)	  cannot	  support	  claims	  that	  young	  infants	  have	  full-­‐blown	  representational	  knowledge	  like	  that	  which	  cognitive	  scientists	  sometimes	  assume	  exists	  in	  adults.	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard’s	  criticism	  is	  particularly	  appropriate	  given	  the	  importance	  of	  recognizing	  that	  all	  psychological	  characteristics	  arise	  in	  development.	  The	  primary	  effect	  of	  notions	  like	  “innate	  representational	  primitives”	  (Carey,	  2009,	  p.	  29)	  or	  “core	  knowledge”	  (Spelke	  &	  Kinzler,	  2007,	  p.	  89)	  is	  to	  “short-­‐circuit	  …	  investigation	  of	  …	  developmental	  relationships”	  (Lehrman,	  1953,	  p.	  359);	  clearly,	  any	  approach	  that	  relies	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  featural	  or	  conceptual	  representations	  that	  are	  foundational—that	  is,	  present	  prior	  to	  development—will	  fail	  to	  explain	  how	  such	  representations	  develop,	  so	  such	  “foundationalism,”	  as	  Allen	  and	  Bickhard	  emphasize,	  has	  no	  place	  in	  truly	  developmental	  theories	  of	  cognition.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  seems	  unnecessary	  at	  present	  to	  dispense	  with	  all	  psychological	  theories	  that	  posit	  a	  role	  for	  encoding	  processes,	  or	  to	  restrict	  ourselves	  in	  the	  future	  to	  using	  only	  action-­‐based	  approaches	  in	  elaborating	  our	  theories.	  Transcending	  the	  nativist-­‐empiricist	  debate	  is	  a	  critical	  step	  in	  bringing	  a	  developmental	  perspective	  to	  cognitive	  psychology,	  but	  transcendence	  is	  within	  reach	  given	  the	  tools	  provided	  by	  DST,	  connectionism,	  and	  other	  interactionist	  approaches	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  knowledge.	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